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Recent Developments
Leary and Covington: Registration and the Fifth
Amendment
In his dissenting opinion in Marchetti v. United States' and Grosso v. United
States,2 Mr. Chief Justice Warren characterized the effect of the Court's hold-
ing in these cases as an "opening [of] the door" to attacks on federal regis-
tration statutes "whenever the registration requirement touches upon alleg-
edly illegal activities."'4 These cases, together with Haynes v. United States,
5
form a trilogy holding, in sum, that criminal prosecution for failure to register
and pay certain taxes under the federal gambling and firearms control stat-
utes is inconsistent with a defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and that assertion of this privilege constitutes a complete de-
fense to the prosecution. These decisions were based upon the premise that
the statutory obligations to register and pay the taxes in question created a
"real and appreciable" risk of self-incrimination. From this basis, the Court
set down the specific criteria for the application of the trilogy. These require
that (a) the area at which the registration statute is directed be one "perme-
ated with criminal statutes"6 in which there exists a statutory scheme pre-
senting " 'real and appreciable' . . . hazards of self-incrimination," 7 and (b)
the registration requirement focus upon a group "inherently suspect of crim-
inal activities," compelling the production of information which "would surely
prove a significant 'link in a chain' of evidence tending to establish . . .
guilt." 8
1. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). For a discussion of the principal registration cases see:
Note, Constitutional Law-Wagering Tax Statutes and the Fifth Amendment, 14
LOYOLA L. REV. 386 (1968); Note, Registration Statutes and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 398 (1968); Note, Marchetti: Federal Registration
and the Fifth Amendment, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 771 (1968); 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 390
(1968); 22 Sw. L.J. 539 (1968).
2. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
3. Id. at 83.
4. Id.
5. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
6. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 47 (1968), quoting Albertson v. SACB,
382 U.S. 70 (1965), which held that registration provisions compelling disclosure of
incriminating information contravene the fifth amendment when "directed at a highly
selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities . . . where response to any of
the form's questions . . . might involve . . . the admission of a crucial element of a
crime." Id. at 79. See generally Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the
Privilege Against Sell-Incrimination and the Government's Need for Inlormation, 1966
SuP. CT. REV. 103.
7. 390 U.S. at 48.
8. Id.
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Almost at once, the attack forecasted by the Chief Justice appeared in the
form of numerous cases seeking to overturn the registration provisions of
the Marihuana Tax Act 9 and the Alcohol Tax Act.10 This note will focus
upon the application of the trilogy rationale to the registration provisions of
the Marihuana Tax Act as explicated by the Court in Leary v. United States"
and United States v. Covington,12 with consideration given to the question
of waiver, the consequences of a timely assertion of the privilege, and the
question of whether the trilogy should be given a retroactive application.
Application of the Trilogy Rationale to the Marihuana Tax Act
The granting of a writ of certiorari in Leary" and the noting of probable juris-
diction in Covington,14 placed the issue of whether the fifth amendment priv-
ilege barred conviction for failure to register and pay the marihuana transfer
tax 5 squarely before the Court.' Prior to the Court's consideration of this
issue, the lower federal courts, with one exception,' 7 had been in agreement
that the registration provisions of the Marihuana Tax Act were not within
the scope of fifth amendment protection.' 8 In Leary, the petitioner had
9. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 4741-62 passim.
10. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 5001-693 passim.
11. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
12. 395 U.S. 57 (1969).
13. Leary v. United States, 392 U.S. 903 (1968).
14. United States v. Covington, 393 U.S. 910 (1968).
15. NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4744(a). Section 4744(a), in conjunction with
Section 4741(a) and Section 4742, forms a comprehensive statutory scheme for the
taxation and registration of marihuana. Section 4741(a) imposes a tax upon all trans-
ferees of marihuana (upon registered individuals at the rate of $1.00 per ounce trans-
ferred and upon unregistered individuals at the rate of $100 per ounce transferred);
Section 4742 requires the transferee to register the intended transfer, obtain an "order
form" from the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate, and to preserve the form for
a period of two years giving the original copy to any other individual to whom he may
transfer the marihuana. Section 4744 makes it unlawful to possess marihuana in the
absence of an order form and failure to produce the order form upon demand "shall
be presumptive evidence of guilt . . . and of liability for the tax imposed by section
4741 (a)."
16. Had the Court granted certiorari in Leary only, it could have limited its con-
sideration of the case to the validity of the statutory presumption contained in 21
U.S.C. § 176a (1964). In Covington, the single issue presented for resolution was the
constitutionality of the registration provisions of the Marihuana Tax Act. Thus the
action of the Court in setting these cases together for the purpose of oral argument
strongly urged a decision with regard to the fifth amendment attack on the marihuana
transfer tax provisions.
17. United States v. Covington, 282 F. Supp. 886 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
18. United States v. Buie, 407 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 395 U.S. 976
(1969) (No. 2083, 1968 Term; renumbered No. 271, 1969 Term); Thompson v.
United States, 403 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1968); Sanchez v. United States, 400 F.2d 92
(5th Cir. 1968); Browning v. United States, 366 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1966); Rule v.
United States, 362 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1018 (1967);
Haynes v. United States, 339 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 924
(1965); Ruiz v. United States, 328 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1964); Manning v. United States,
274 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1960); Ramseur v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D.
[Vol. XIX: 87
Recent Developments
been indicted for violation of the transfer tax provision of the Marihuana
Tax Act. 19 After a motion for a judgment of acquittal was denied, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the conviction and rejected the argument, raised by the defendant for
the first time on appeal, that the registration provisions of the Act violated his
constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 20  Following
the decisions in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes,21 the defendant filed a peti-
tion for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc. The Court of Ap-
peals in a per curiam opinion denied the petition and held that the trilogy
rationale was not applicable to cases involving the Marihuana Tax Act since
it was possible for a person to qualify as a lawful possessor of marihuana
under the Act.22 The court noted also that Leary had affirmatively waived
his fifth amendment privilege by taking the stand and "testifying fully to the
details of his acquisition . . .of marihuana without having paid the tax or
having secured the. . . written order forms."
'23
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit's approach in Leary, the district court in
Covington granted the motion to dismiss an indictment which had charged
the defendant with the acquisition of marihuana without having paid the
transfer tax required by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section
4744(a). 24  The district court ruled that the fifth amendment privilege as
interpreted by the trilogy provided a complete defense to the prosecution.
In responding to the government's argument that the defendant did not face
a "real and appreciable" risk of incrimination because he could not possibly
have qualified under the Act to pay the tax, the court held that if the de-
fendant could not have paid the tax there could be no basis for the indict-
ment. The government took a direct appeal to the United States Supreme
Court.25
One of the elements essential to the application of the trilogy rationale is
clearly present in the case of marihuana regulation; namely, it is an area
Tenn. 1968); United States v. Vial, 282 F. Supp. 472 (D. Mass. 1968); United States v.
Reyes, 280 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Arrizon v. United States, 224 F. Supp.
26 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
19. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4744(a).
20. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 870 (5th Cir. 1967). Although Leary
originally raised several issues, including a first amendment defense, only one is germane
to the present discussion, namely, whether the registration and transfer tax provisions
of the Marihuana Tax Act violated the privilege against self-incrimination.
21. Leary had been tried on March 11, 1966, and his conviction was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on September 29, 1967. Marchetti, Grosso,
and Haynes were decided on January 29, 1968.
22. Leary v. United States, 392 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1968).
23. Id. at 222.
24. United States v. Covington, 282 F. Supp. 886 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964) authorizes direct appeal by the government from
dismissal of an indictment when the decision is one "sustaining a motion in bar" or
"is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment
... is founded."
1969]
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permeated with criminal statutes. In addition to a comprehensive federal
scheme, 26 all states have statutes providing criminal sanctions for the unau-
thorized possession and use of marihuana.2 7 The Court in Leary specifically
pointed out that at the time the petitioner failed to comply with the Act, the
possession of marihuana was a crime in every state.28 The Court concluded
from this fact that "the class of possessors who were both unregistered and
obliged to obtain an order form constituted a 'selective group inherently sus-
pect of criminal activities.' "29
In order to fully appreciate whether compliance with the Marihuana Tax
Act presents a "real and appreciable" risk of self-incrimination, an examina-
tion of the statutory scheme is essential. The Act has two main sub-parts.
One part deals with an annual occupational tax80 and the other imposes a
tax upon all transferees of marihuana. 31 The occupational tax assesses a
relatively nominal tax upon a "special" class of persons whose pursuits in the
area of marihuana are prima facie a legitimate or commercial endeavor.
These persons must register with the nearest district office of the Internal
Revenue Service. 32
Section 4741 of the Act imposes a tax upon all transferees of marihuana
including those who have registered and paid the occupational tax. Like-
wise, Section 4742 makes it unlawful for any person "whether or not
required to pay a special tax and register"33 to transfer marihuana without
the written order form issued by the Secretary of the Treasury or his dele-
gate.84  (Emphasis added). Treasury regulations require that the order
form must show the name and address of the transferee and transferor; the
individual's registration number, if registered; and the amount of marihuana
to be transferred.35 It is also required that the transferee first submit an
26. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4741-76.
27. Forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have passed the
UNIFORM NARCOTIC DRUG ACT, while California and Pennsylvania have independent
legislation. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§ 11000-11853 (West 1964); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, §§ 780-2(g), 780-4(q) (Purdon 1964).
28. 395 U.S. at 16 (1969).
29. Id. at 18.
30. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 4751-53.
31. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4741(a)(1), (2).
32. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4753.
33. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4742. A definite distinction is made in Section 4741
of the Act regarding application of the transfer tax. Taxpayers who have previously
registered under Section 4751 (the occupational tax provisions) are assessed at the
rate of one dollar per ounce of marihuana transferred, while "[ulpon each transfer to
any person who has not paid the special tax and registered . . . $100 per ounce" is
assessed. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4741(a)(2) (emphasis added). Such variance
suggests that the statute considered as a whole presents two schemes, one directed at
the lawful pursuits of registered individuals, and the other directed at the illicit ac-
tivities of unregistered individuals.
34. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4742(a).
35. Treas. Reg. §§ 152.66, 152.69 (1964).
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application containing this specific information before an order form may
be issued.3 6  Section 4744 makes it a crime to carry out a transfer without
a written order form signifying prepayment of the tax. A list of those who
have paid the special taxes and been issued order forms is kept in the dis-
trict office of the Internal Revenue Service and will be furnished to state
and local prosecutors upon request.3 7 Individuals who tendered payment
of the transfer tax were also subject to similar disclosures by the Internal
Revenue Service.3 8 The Court in Leary, upon analysis of the statutory
scheme, concluded that the "[p]etitioner had ample reason to fear that
transmittal . . . of the fact that he was a recent, unregistered transferee of
marihuana 'would surely prove a significant link in a chain of evidence tend-
ing to establish his guilt' under the state marihuana laws then in effect."13 9
Thus, the second criterion of the trilogy had been satisfied.
In Leary, as well as in Covington, the Government urged a construction of
the Act whereby "its incriminatory aspect [would] be seen to vanish or
shrink to less than constitutional proportions. '40  It was argued that the
registration requirements of the Act were aimed at the legitimate market
and as drafted and administered they presupposed and applied only to ac-
tivities which were otherwise lawful. The Government contended that the
Act, when scrutinized in light of consistent administrative interpretation and
application, presented no real and appreciable risk of self-incrimination since
the Treasury Department had always denied applications for order forms
from unregistered persons and had refused to accept prepayment of the tax
by such individuals. The Government viewed the Act as totally proscribing
transfers of marihuana by other than lawful registrants. Individuals who
could not deal lawfully in marihuana were ineligible to obtain the order
forms and, because only information as to lawful activities was supplied,
those who were permitted to comply with the Act were not incriminating
themselves. In support of this construction, the Government pointed to
Treasury Regulations which require that proposed applicants make a show-
ing of lawful purpose as a condition precedent to the issuance of an order
36. Id.
37. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6107. In his dissent in Marchetti and Grosso,
Chief Justice Warren contended that "[w]hat seems to trouble the Court is not that
registration is required but that the information obtained through the registration re-
quirement is turned over by federal officials, under statutory compulsion of 26 U.S.C.
§ 6107, to . . .prosecutors." 390 U.S. at 81 (1968).
38. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4773.
39. 395 U.S. at 16 (1969). The Court further noted that "[iut is also possible that
compliance with the Act also would have created a substantial risk of incrimination
under 21 U.S.C. § 176a, the other federal statute which petitioner was convicted of
violating." Id. at n.14.
40. Id. at 18.
19691
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form.41 This line of reasoning attempts to remove the statute from the area
of constitutional attack by denying unregistered persons the opportunity to
pay the $100 per ounce transfer tax which the statute clearly assesses upon
them.42 The Court found the legislative history of the Act to evince a con-
gressional intent contrary to the construction urged by the Government. At
the time the bill was introduced, the Department of the Treasury feared that
the courts would deny to Congress absolute authority to regulate the use and
possession of marihuana to the exclusion of the states.43  Thus, desiring to
avoid any possibility of constitutional attack, the device of a prohibitive tax
of the type that had been upheld in Sonzinsky v. United States44 was
adopted.
The Treasury Department, as sponsor of the legislation, intended that its
registration provisions be patterned after those of the National Firearms
Act. 45  That Act allowed an individual to purchase a machine or sub-ma-
chine gun, but only after the individual paid a $200 transfer tax and pro-
vided certain information to the Treasury Department on an official order
form. Testifying in support of the Marihuana Tax Act, the Assistant Gen-
eral Counsel of the Department of the Treasury stated that "[t]his bill would
permit anyone to purchase marihuana as was done in the National Firearms
Act . . but he would have to pay a tax of $100 per ounce . . . and make
his purchase on an official order form."'46
Since the firearm registration statutes which served as the model for the
marihuana provisions had been declared unconstitutional by the Court in
41. Treas. Reg. § 152.23 (1964) provides that "[t]he application of every person
shall show that, under the laws of the jurisdiction in which he is operating or proposes
to operate, he is legally qualified or lawfully entitled to engage in the activities for
which registration is sought." But see Treas. Reg. § 152.45 (1964) which states that
"[p]ersons who engage in business in violation of the law of a State are, nevertheless,
required to pay [the] special tax ....
42. Assuming arguendo the validity of the Government's construction, serious con-
stitutional problems would still appear to plague the Act. The petitioner would have
been denied due process by being convicted for failure to perform an act which the
Government made impossible for him to perform. Similarly, due to the presumption
in the Act, guilt arises in part from failure to produce a form which the Government
has made impossible to obtain. See Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
43. Hearings on H.R. 6385 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1937). [Hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 6385]. This
fear was based upon an earlier attack on a provision of the Harrison Narcotic Act,
forerunner of the Marihuana Tax Act, by dissenting minorities of the Supreme Court
in both Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332 (1928) and United States v. Doremus,
249 U.S. 86 (1919). The provision was attacked on the ground that it was an attempt
to regulate matters reserved to the states under the tenth amendment.
44. 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
45. 48 Stat. 1236 (1934). This Act was later incorporated into the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939.
46. Hearings on H.R. 6385, at 14.
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Haynes v. United States47 as violative of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, the Court, in Leary, had "no hesitation" in concluding that the interpre-
tation of the transfer provisions urged by the Government was "contrary
to the manifest congressional intent that transfers to nonregistrants be taxed,
not forbidden. ' 48  The Court further concluded that those regulations which
required a showing of lawfulness by applicants, when viewed in light of the
legislative history, supported the proposition that illicit users, although not
entitled to register, were still held liable for their failure to produce the order
form signifying successful registration and prepayment of the transfer tax.
Such a scheme "compelled [the] petitioner to expose himself to a 'real and
appreciable' risk of self-incrimination, within the meaning of . . . Mar-
chetti, Grosso, and Haynes."4 9  Accordingly, the conviction in Leary was
reversed and the dismissal of the indictment in Covington was affirmed.
Waiver of the Trilogy Protection
Prior to the decisions in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes, it was generally held
that registration and occupational tax statutes did not infringe upon the
privilege against self-incrimination, but rather imposed a "choice" upon an
individual to either refrain from an activity or to participate in it at the risk
of being penalized for failure to provide incriminating information concerning
the nature of the illegal activities engaged in.50 This line of reasoning was
specifically rejected in Marchetti, for "if such an inference of antecedent
choice [between restraint and participation] were alone enough to abrogate
the privilege's protection, it would be . . . withheld from those who most
require it."' The constitutional privilege is not waived "merely be-
cause those 'inherently suspect of criminal activities' have been commanded
either to cease [their illegal activities] or to provide information incriminat-
ing to themselves, and have ultimately elected to do neither.
52
The problem of waiver of the trilogy protection has arisen most frequently
in situations where the defendant failed to assert his fifth amendment priv-
ilege at trial and seeks to raise the defense for the first time on appeal. The
privilege, being a substantive defense to the prosecution in such cases, is
not limited merely to testifying in judicial proceedings.53 In Leary, the
47. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
48. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 23-24 (1969).
49. Id. at 16.
50. Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S.
22 (1953).
51. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 51 (1968).
52. id. at 52.
53. In this respect, the exercise of the defendant's discretion in refusing to take the
stand in his own behalf is only one circumstance to be weighed against the totality
when determining whether the privilege has been effectively and intelligently waived.
19691
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defendant had taken the stand and testified to the details of his acquisition
of marihuana in order to rebut the presumption of knowing importation
under the other federal statute he was charged with violating.5 4 Had he not
taken the stand, the statutory presumption of knowledge of illegal importation
would have "authorized conviction." Thus, if the privilege was held to offer
testimonial protection only, it could have been effectively abrogated in all
federal marihuana prosecutions by joinder of an illegal importation count
with a transfer tax count.
While the Court has yet to carve out precise guidelines defining what
constitutes an effective and intelligent waiver of the trilogy defense, certain
criteria may be drawn from a review of decisions dealing with the question
of waiver. Marchetti and Grosso clearly enunciated the principle that the
privilege, asserted at the trial level, acts as a complete defense to prosecu-
tions encompassed by the trilogy rationale. A more difficult question was
presented in Haynes, where the defendant entered a plea of guilty after his
motion to dismiss the indictment had been denied. On appeal, he sought
to withdraw his plea of guilty and rely upon the argument raised in his pre-
trial motion that compliance with the registration provisions of the National
Firearms Act required incriminatory statements and therefore prosecution
for failure to comply with the provisions of the Act was constitutionally im-
permissible. In reversing the conviction, the Court held that his plea of
guilty did not serve to waive his previous claim of constitutional privilege.55
In Leary the Court reaffirmed the proposition that failure to raise the defense
at trial does not constitute an absolute waiver of the trilogy protection, while
in Covington it was held that the privilege may properly be invoked by a
motion to dismiss the indictment.
Lower federal courts have generally adopted an ad hoc approach to the
question of waiver of the trilogy defense. In Gillespie v. United States,56
the Seventh Circuit held that a plea of guilty acts as a waiver of all defenses,
known and unknown, while the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Miller,
57
has permitted the withdrawal of a guilty plea and allowed the defendant to
plead the privilege against self-incrimination. Where the defendant's trial
54. 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964) prohibits the importation of marihuana and also
"authorize[s] conviction" based upon a showing of mere possession. Under the
statute, the presumption is created that anyone in possession of marihuana has knowl-
edge of the fact that it was illegally imported.
55. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 n.2 (1968). See also United States
v. Ury, 106 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939), which held that a plea of guilty does not operate
as a waiver of a previous claim of constitutional privilege.
56. 409 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1969) (firearms). See also Whaley v. United States,
394 F.2d 399 (10th Cir. 1968) (firearms); Yearwood v. United States, 294 F. Supp.
748 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (narcotics).
57. 406 F.2d 1100 (1969) (firearms).
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occurred prior to the decisions in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes, the courts
have allowed the trilogy defense to be raised for the first time on appeal.
58
Some courts have attempted to minimize the effect of the trilogy by holding
that the privilege must be asserted at the time the incriminating matter is
offered against the defendant 9 or that the privilege is not properly asserted
if raised for the first time after conviction and sentencing. 60 Such narrow
construction of the trilogy protection appears both unwarranted and incon-
sistent with the Court's application of the privilege in Leary and indicates
the need for criteria outlining the scope of an effective and intelligent waiver
of the fifth amendment guarantee.
Consequences of a Timely Assertion of the Trilogy Protection
Consistent with the concept expressed by the trilogy that a timely assertion
of the fifth amendment privilege provides a complete defense to the prosecu-
tion, invocation of the privilege by motion at a pretrial stage of the proceed-
ings will lead to a dismissal of the indictment. 61 In Covington, the Court
affirmed the dismissal of the indictment and noted that such disposition was
proper "if trial of the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense
would be of no assistance in determining the validity of the defense." It
further concluded that "[t]he question [of] whether the defendant faced a
substantial risk of incrimination is usually one of law which may be resolved
without reference to the circumstances of the alleged offense."
'0 2
Timely assertion of the trilogy protection will also result in the suppression
of evidence seized pursuant to warrants based solely on alleged violations
of the federal wagering registration provisions. 63 Likewise, the privilege has
been successfully asserted in a civil action brought by the United States to
58. Lauchli v. United States, 402 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1968) (firearms); Drennon
v. United States, 393 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1968) (firearms); Greenwood v. United
States, 392 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1968) (wagering). See also Grosso v. United States,
390 U.S. 62, 71 (1968), where the Court concluded that petitioner's failure to raise
the self-incrimination issue at the trial level did not constitute an effective waiver of the
constitutional protection.
59. Williams v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1969).
60. Nunley v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. Okla. 1968) (narcotics); United
States v. Rodgers, 288 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Okla. 1968) (wagering).
61. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(1) states that "[a]ny defense or objection which is
capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before
trial by motion." See United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57 (1969).
62. United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57, 60 (1969). See also United States v.
Freeman, 412 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1969) (marihuana); Cedillo v. United States,
391 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1968) (firearms); United States v. Fincher, 391 F.2d 603
(2nd Cir. 1968) (wagering); United States v. Fine, 293 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Tenn.
1968) (distilled spirits).
63. Silbert v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 635 (D. Md. 1968).
1969]
Catholic University Law Review
enjoin individuals from participating in the business of accepting wagers until
they had complied with the federal wagering tax statutes. 64
As a corollary to the decisions in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes, the issue
has arisen whether the trilogy protection is available as a defense in a civil
forfeiture proceeding.65 Leary and Covington should generate similar at-
tempts to apply the privilege defensively in such proceedings and thereby
thwart governmental attempts to proceed against vehicles that have been
used to transport contraband where the taxes imposed on such contraband
have not been paid. Currently, the circuit courts are split-the trilogy ra-
tionale has been held to be applicable where the forfeiture proceedings are
quasi-criminal,66 but where forfeiture is viewed as an action in rem this ra-
tionale has been rejected. In support of this latter view the Sixth Circuit held,
in United States v. One 1965 Buick,67 that the "mere fact that an exclusion-
ary rule of evidence [resulting from the application of the trilogy rationale]
may prevent a conviction for the criminal offense of violating the Internal
Revenue laws, does not expunge civil liability for payment of the tax."66
By holding forfeiture proceedings to be actions in rem (and thereby permit-
ting forfeiture despite the trilogy defense) the Sixth Circuit went beyond
recognizing the existence of a civil liability for the payment of tax. By so
doing it allowed the Government to collect indirectly much more than it
could have collected directly." However, "It]he Sixth Circuit opinion ap-
pears to misconceive the true nature of a forfeiture proceeding[701 ....
The Government does not seek to recover the tax which it is owed, but in-
stead seeks the forfeiture of property used by the gambler; the gambler re-
mains liable civilly for the full amount of the tax."'1  (Emphasis added).
64. United States v. Riccio, 282 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
65. See 26 U.S.C. § 7302 (1964) and 49 U.S.C. §§ 781-88 (1964).
66. United States v. United States Coin and Currency in the Amount of $8674, 393
F.2d 499 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 393 U.S. 949 (1968) (No. 477, 1968 Term; re-
numbered No. 8, 1969 Term).
67. 392 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1968), petition for cert. filed, sub nom. Dean v. United
States, 37 U.S.L.W. 3139 (U.S., Oct. 8, 1968) (No. 619, 1968 Term; renumbered No.
12, 1969 Term).
68. Id. at 676. See also Brief for the United States at 19 n.23, Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950). In Grosso v.
United States, 390 U.S. 62, 69, 70 n.7 (1968), the Court was careful to note that "[w]e
do not hold . . . that a proper claim of privilege extinguishes liability for taxation."
69. Take, for example, the case of a person arrested for possession of two ounces
of marihuana while driving his automobile. His criminal conviction might be barred by
the trilogy defense but he would still be civilly liable for payment of the tax on the
transfer by which he came into possession of the marihuana. In this case it would
amount to $200. The Sixth Circuit, however, would allow the forfeiture of a $5,000
automobile in satisfaction of the $200 liability.
70. The Supreme Court views forfeiture proceedings as essentially quasi-criminal
actions. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).




In United States v. United States Coin and Currency in Amount of
$8674,72 the Seventh Circuit was confronted with a similar problem. In its
initial ruling, the court affirmed a judgment for the Government and held
that the privilege against self-incrimination did not operate as a bar to a
civil forfeiture proceeding. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Mar-
chetti, Grosso, and Haynes. On remand, the Seventh Circuit held that those
who cannot be punished directly for violation of the federal registration re-
quirements "should not be punished indirectly through forfeiture." 8  Con-
sistently with this view, various district courts have upheld the availability
of the privilege as a bar to civil forfeiture proceedings predicated upon viola-
tion of areas encompassed by the trilogy rationale. 74 With both the conflict-
ing Sixth and Seventh Circuit decisions on the Supreme Court's 1969-70
docket, resolution of this problem should be forthcoming.
Retroactive or Prospective Application
In Stovall v. Denno,75 the Supreme Court set forth the criteria to be con-
sidered in determining whether a new constitutional rule should be given a
retroactive or prospective application. Factors to be considered are: "(a)
the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance
by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." 76
Applying these principles, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Miller
77
has held that the decision in Haynes should be given a retroactive applica-
tion. Noting that a retroactive application of the trilogy protection would
overturn only federally obtained convictions, the court stressed that a "con-
viction for failure to file the incriminatory form demanded by the statute
could be sustained only in blatant disregard of the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege." s78 Thus in every case a different result on retrial would be compelled.
72. 379 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1967), vacated and remanded, sub nom. Angelini v.
United States, 390 U.S. 204 (1968).
73. United States v. United States Coin and Currency in the Amount of $8674, 393
F.2d 499, 500 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 393 U.S. 949 (1968) (No. 477, 1968 Term;
renumbered No. 8, 1969 Term).
74. United States v. One Philco Television, 292 F. Supp. 35 (S.D. Tex. 1968);
United States v. One 1967 Buick Electra 225, 289 F. Supp. 642 (D.N.J. 1968); United
States v. $125,882 in United States Currency, 286 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United
States v. $3,296.00 in Currency, 286 F. Supp. 543 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
75. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
76. Id. at 297.
77. 406 F.2d 1100 (1969). Some district courts have also held the privilege to
operate retroactively, see Isaac v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1096 (D.S.C. 1968);
United States v. One Philco Television, 292 F. Supp. 35 (S.D. Tex. 1968); United
States v. $125,882 in United States Currency, 286 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
78. United States v. Miller, 406 F.2d 1100, 1104 (4th Cir. 1969). Joining in this
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Any reliance by law enforcement officials would appear to be outweighed
by the fact that a retroactive application of the trilogy protection goes directly
to the constitutional validity of the offense for which the defendant has been
convicted.
Contrasted with this approach is the view expressed by the Sixth Circuit
in Graham v. United States79 that the purpose of the trilogy would be ade-
quately served by applying it prospectively. Considering the effect of retrials
on the administration of justice and the reliance by law enforcement officials
on previous standards, the court concluded that retroactive application of the
trilogy was unwarranted. Though the Supreme Court has not explicitly
given the trilogy retroactive effect, it has implicitly accorded it a greater de-
gree of retroactivity than other recent decisions in the fifth amendment area.
Both Griffin v. Californias° and Miranda v. Arizona"' were accorded a
prospective effect by the Court, but the decisions in Marchetti, Grosso, and
Haynes have been applied to 23 cases which were on appeal to the Supreme
Court at the time the trilogy was decided.12 In each, the judgments below
were vacated and the cases remanded for further consideration in light of
Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes. By this action, the Court granted the trilogy
that type of retroactivity observed in Linkletter v. Walker,8 where the ex-
clusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio8 4 was applied to all cases on direct appeal at
the time Mapp was decided.
Although an explicit holding of retroactivity has not been forthcoming
from the Court, its action in the case of Forgett v. United States8" is most
interesting. On March 4, 1968, the Court, on a petition for rehearing,
granted certiorari and vacated its prior order denying certiorari.86 It then
view, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Luccia, 38 U.S.L.W. 2212 (Sept. 17, 1969),
afforded Marchetti retroactive application to vacate the 1965 conviction of a coram
nobis petitioner. The court held that neither a guilty plea at trial, nor completion of a
resulting prison sentence can deprive an individual of vindication of his fifth amendment
rights.
79. 407 F.2d 1313 (1969). See also Williams v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 376
(D. Minn. 1968).
80. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406
(1966) which limited application of Griffin to trials which were commenced after the
date of that decision.
81. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) which
held that the new constitutional standards enunciated in Miranda were applicable only
to custodial interrogations which took place after the date of that decis'on.
82. See Stone v. United States, 390 U.S. 204 (1968) (six cases); Forgett v. United
States, 390 U.S. 203 (1968); Piccioli v. United States, 390 U.S. 202 (1968) (seven
cases); DeCesare v. United States, 390 U.S. 200 (1968) (seven cases); Lee v. Kansas
City, 390 U.S. 197 (1968); Rainwater v. Florida, 390 U.S. 196 (1968).
83. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
84. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).




proceeded to remand the case for further consideration in light of Haynes.
By following this course of action, the Court thus gave Haynes full retroactive
effect by applying it to a conviction which had become final with a denial
of certiorari in 1966. Whether this action indicates a preference for full
retroactive application of the trilogy and its offspring-Leary and Covington
-is conjecture and will remain so until such time as the Court chooses to
handle the issue directly.
A Constitutionally Permissible Solution
Leary and Covington, like the trilogy, ultimately raise more problems than
they solve, but they are not problems incapable of solution. If the federal
government is to persist in its use of "registration" statutes to gain a juris-
dictional foothold over certain criminal acts which would otherwise be purely
state offenses, the most effective means of preserving its registration system
from continued constitutional attack is to engraft immunity restrictions upon
the subsequent use of information derived from registration. If immunity re-
strictions bar government officials from divulging the contents of registration
forms to federal and state prosecutors, potential registrants can no longer con-
tend that they are presented with "real and appreciable" risks of incrimina-
tion. Until the introduction of the proposed Wagering Tax Amendments
of 1969,87 the Government had failed to pursue this approach despite the
fact that the Supreme Court had characterized immunity restrictions as "an
attractive and apparently practical resolution of the difficult problem."88 The
revised Section 4412 in the proposed legislation retains the registration re-
quirement for those engaged in the business of accepting or receiving wagers,
but Section 4423 imposes broad restrictions upon disclosure permissible under
the Act. Government officials may not divulge "any information derived,
directly or indirectly, from any such return, payment, registration or rec-
ord."89 Permissible disclosure is confined to use in civil or criminal prosecu-
tion for nonpayment of the tax, and unauthorized disclosure is a misde-
meanor punishable by a $1,000 fine or one year imprisonment, or both.90
In drafting proposed "stop-gap" legislation to shore up the constitutional
deficiencies inherent in the registration requirements of the Marihuana Tax
87. S. 1624, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Section 2 of the bill would amend
Section 4423 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide limitations on the dis-
closure of information found in the registration forms.
88. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58 (1968). See also Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
89. S. 1624, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1969), amending INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 4423 (a)(3).
90. Id. § 3(a), amending INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7213.
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Act,91 the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has chosen an alter-
native solution rather than impose immunity restrictions upon the statutory
scheme. The main feature of this proposed legislation is the amendment of
Sections 4722 and 4753 of the Internal Revenue Code to require an appli-
cant to show that his proposed activities are legal under state law before he
is allowed to prepay the tax and complete the required order form.9 2 The
disclosure provisions of the Act remain intact, but by definition would pro-
vide information as to individuals who have already shown that their activi-
ties are lawful. Therefore it is believed that the fifth amendment problem is
alleviated because no incriminatory information is gained through registra-
tion.
The proposed legislation does not, in fact, solve all the constitutional prob-
lems with the Marihuana Tax Act. Under the new legislation individuals
are to be prosecuted for failure to pay a tax which the government makes
impossible for them to pay. Thus, while the self-incrimination problems
may have been cured, the Act is susceptible to a fifth amendment due process
attack on the grounds that prosecution is predicated upon failure to perform
an act which the government makes impossible to perform. In curing one
problem in the Act, another of equally serious magnitude has been raised.
Just as the trilogy raised litigation and developed law in areas not com-
pletely anticipated, so the decisions in Leary and Covington will have their
own marked effects in each of these sensitive and controversial areas of
development. Until such time as enforcement of the federal registration
statutes can be made consistent with the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination9" it is likely that many more petitioners will move on through
the "open door," as Chief Justice Warren predicted, spurred on by the de-
cisions in Leary and Covington.
91. S. 2657, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
92. Section 4741 of the Internal Revenue Code would also be amended to eliminate
the disparity of taxation between registered and unregistered individuals. See note 33
supra. Rather than the previous tax assessment of $100 per ounce on unregistered in-
dividuals and one dollar per ounce on registered individuals, all individuals will be
taxed at the rate of one dollar per ounce of marihuana transferred.
93. As an alternative to the imposition of immunity restrictions, Judge Henry J.
Friendly has suggested that the fifth amendment be revised so as to be inapplicable to
the area of federal registration requirements. See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CINN. L. REV. 671, 721-22
(1968).
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